This paper examines the extent to which there is currently a "dollar standard" in Latin America by empirically looking at the time series relationships between local currencies and the major global currencies using daily data over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006]. The results indicate that three countries in the Andes -Ecuador (which is officially dollarized), Bolivia, and Peru -are on practically perfect dollar standards and might find additional financial integration fairly practicable. Four more countries -Guyana, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay -are nearly on a dollar standard and might easily move closer to dollarization. Guyana, Uruguay, and Paraguay have economies substantially smaller than that of Ecuador, which has already officially dollarized, and might find similar full dollarization relatively easy. Argentina, although having abandoned its currency board mechanism, seems to be engineering (or at least allowing) a persistent, though imperfect, link to the dollar. Mexico and Colombia are on a partial dollar standard, but exhibit influence from other currencies as well (the yen and the pound for Mexico, and the yen and the euro for Colombia). Four additional currencies investigated -Chile, Brazil, Canada, and Venezuela -are further from a dollar standard but are certainly not completely independent of the dollar either.
Introduction
Monetary integration has been the subject of considerable attention over the past few decades. European monetary integration has been the primary focus, as studies proliferated before, during, and after the creation of the euro. Asian monetary integration has been discussed more recently at both the policy level and in the academic literature. The presumption that multilateral efforts to promote monetary integration in Latin America are irrelevant is somewhat debatable. Mercosur (consisting of Argent ina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and, since July 2006, Venezuela) has occasionally expressed an interest in monetary unification and its own common currency, and the issue has received academic attention (e.g., see Eichengreen, 1998) .
1 Similarly, the Cartegena 1 Eichengreen (1998) finds that Mercosur countries (without Venezuela) had unusually variable exchange rates and discusses the need to reduce exchange rate variability in the Agreement establishing the Andean Community (consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) calls for "harmonization of exchange rate, monetary, financial and fiscal policies." In reality, neither Mercosur nor the Andean Community has made any real progress toward monetary integration.
Very little academic work has broadly examined monetary integration throughout Latin America. One exception is Larraín and Tavares (2003) , which studies the Mercosur and Andean countries plus Chile and Mexico and concludes that Latin America displays a low level of regional integration relative to bilateral levels of integration with the U.S. The implication of this is that adoption of the U.S. dollar is more appropriate than creation of a regional currency. We thus take this as a point of departure for our current investigation.
This paper considers all of the countries of Mercosur and the Andean Community, and more, but considers them separately and only considers whether they are close to a dollar standard. The focus is mainly on the countries in South America, plus Mexico, during a post-crisis era from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2006 in order to investigate the current situation. This period is important because the major crises associated with Latin America were largely finished by the end of 2002. Argentina surrendered its 1:1 fixed exchange rate peg to the dollar and defaulted on its sovereign debt during the first half of 2002. These problems spilled over to Uruguay, and the region. However, he also firmly asserts that a dollar standard would not be feasible: "Pegging each of the Mercosur currencies to a common external numeraire like the U.S. dollar is an extremely indirect way of solving the problem of intra-Mercosur exchangerate variability. It forecloses not just intra-Mercosur exchange rate changes as an instrument of adjustment but also, in effect, changes in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This is such a Byzantine solution to Mercosur's exchange rate problem that we can safely ignore it (p. 24)." government floated the Uruguayan peso in June. By August, Uruguay received a rescue package from the IMF to stabilize its financial situation. Hence, we begin our study in America?" by examining the behavior of exchange rates in the region. More directly, we ask whether there is a "dollar standard" in Latin America by looking at the time series relationships between local currencies and the major global currencies.
The empirical approach to this question is not entirely new, as some authors have considered monetary integration in Asia using insights adopted in this paper. For example, Frankel and Wei (1994) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) use regression analysis to detect the influence of various foreign currencies on particular Asian currencies. This paper seeks to apply the same inquiry to Latin America -and, to the author's knowledge, is the first paper to do so. In addition, the paper considers modern time series analysis more seriously, although the most appropriate analysis turns out to be the simplest regression approach.
The empirical results suggest that there are three categories of countries for a Latin American dollar standard. Three countries -Ecuador, Bo livia, and Peru -are on a practically perfect dollar standard. Four more countries -Guyana, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay -are nearly on a dollar standard. Two countries --Mexico and Colombia --are on a partial dollar standard, but exhibit influence from other currencies as well (the yen and the pound for Mexico, and the yen and the euro for Colombia). Four additional countries investigated -Chile, Brazil, Canada, and Venezuela -are further from a dollar standard but are certainly not completely independent of the dollar either.
This paper is organized into four sections. After this introduction, the second section provides a concise discussion of the issues drawing on the existing literature. The third section then presents the empirical ana lysis, including discussion of the methodology and the results of the investigation. The final section offers concluding remarks.
Discussion of the Issue
Two areas of the literature on monetary policy have a direct relationship to the investigation of whether there is a "dollar standard" in Latin America. The topic is usually considered within the contexts of optimum currency areas and dollarization, both of which are considered below.
Optimum Currency Areas and Anchor Currencies
The subject of monetary integration in Latin America is part of the larger topic of optimum currency areas, as monetary integration might be a direct consequence of being an optimal currency area. This paper does not address the question of whether Latin
America is an optimal currency area, but instead has a more modest objective of simply determining the extent of monetary integration in Latin America by examining the behavior of exchange rates. For an overview of research on whether Latin America is an optimum currency area based on the traditional Mundell (1961) criteria, see TempranoArroyo (2003) . Moreover, see Larraín and Tavares (2003) for investigation of the issue as to whether Latin America is an optimum currency area in itself or part of an optimum currency area with the U.S.
As an extension of the traditional optimum currency area literature, recent research has reconsidered optimum currency areas within the context of anchor currencies. Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003) investigate optimal currency areas by identifying countries that would logically be anchored to the dollar, the euro, or the yen.
The empirical analysis focuses on data for three factors over the period 1960-1997: trade intensity with respect to GDP; inflation and price co-movements; and output comovements. With respect to Latin American countries, they suggest that there is a "fairly clear dollar area including Canada, Mexico, most of Central America, and parts of South America (excluding Argentina and Brazil) (p. 332)".
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A brief summary of results in Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003) for Canada, Mexico, and South American countries (which constitute the countries examined later in this paper) is presented in Table 1 . Canada is extremely tied to the U.S. in all three dimensions, and the Canadian dollar would thus be logically anchored to the U.S. dollar.
Mexico is quite close to the U.S. based on strong values for trade share and comovement of prices, but not with respect to comovement of output (which is much weaker anyway).
Argentina is likely part of the euro bloc based on all three dimensions, though Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro point out that "Argentina has been large ly closed to international trade, and its output and price co-movements are not high with any of the three potential anchors (p. 331)." As a result, "Argentina does not appear to be an obvious member of a currency union with the euro or the U.S. dollar." Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003) also suggest that Brazil is likely part of a euro bloc by virtue of its high comovement of output with the European countries, although its trade and price comovements are marginally higher with the U.S. The only other country receiving definitive attention is Ecuador, which Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro point out is much closer to the dollar than the euro. Based on the summary table, the same might be said about Guyana, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003) also note that Chile and Uruguay have higher exports to Europe, but larger co-movements with the U.S., so choice of anchor is not clear.
Official and Financial Dollarization
In addition to considering the choice of an anchor currency based on fundamental factors (such as the trade intensity, price and inflation comove ments, and output comovements), a second perspective begins with the premise that the dollar is the most important global currency, and has been for a long time. 5 As such, it is the most attractive substitute for local currencies when they become dysfunctional. As currency substitution progresses, references to "dollarization" increase. The term "dollarization" can mean anything from, at one extreme, official adoption of the U.S. dollar by the sovereign government, to unofficial use of the dollar within the economy.
Historically, the U.S. dollar has been very important in the economies of Latin America. High inflation and political risk have caused many people in Latin America to hold dollars instead of local currencies, and in some countries the dollar is even a regular medium of exchange. The choice of the dollar is likely due no t only to the dollar's role as the pre-eminent global currency, but also to the geographic proximity of Latin America to the U.S. relative to Europe or Japan.
Ecuador presents a case of the most extreme dollarization. In 2000, the government officially adopted the U.S. dollar and withdrew the local currency, the sucre, from circulation as a response to an ongoing economic crisis (including a banking crisis) and hyperinflation. Dollarization brought major benefits in terms of stabilizing prices, and by most accounts contributed to growth. This official dollarization has been maintained, making Ecuador the poster child for the dollar standard in Latin America. to maintain a reserve to provide short-term liquidity to banks (as a limited version of a central bank's usual role as lender of last resort); and to compile statistics and conduct economic research. 7 The recent official dollarization in Ecuador has fomented more debate on the issues, ranging from estimation of the benefits and costs to evaluations of its success and assessments of the potential for dollarization in other coutries.
The literature on official dollarization is wide-ranging, but typically centers on discussion of its benefits and costs in different countries. The main benefits are: (1) transaction costs of exchanging the local currency for dollars are eliminated; (2) foreign exchange risk against the dollar is eliminated; (3) the country imports the U.S. level of price stability; (4) the country is more integrated with global financial markets (and possibly enjoys lower interest rates on borrowing); and (5) the possibility of foreign exchange and financial crises is greatly reduced. In addition, dollarization may encourage fiscal discipline and stimulate economic growth. 8 The main costs are: (1) loss of independent monetary and exchange rate policy; (2) loss of seigniorage revenues from having a domestic currency; and (3) reduction in the ability of the central bank to serve as lender of last resort to the domestic banking system. For more on benefits and costs, see Antinolfi and Keister (2001) .
Several countries have experienced financial dollarization. In Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay, the U.S. dollar is legal tender and residents are permitted to hold dollar deposits or take dollar loans in their home countries. This has led to more attention to the management of monetary policy in dollarized economies, particularly focusing on the superintendent of banks so the Central Bank does not supervise or regulate banks, and the deposit guarantee system not administered by the Central Bank of Ecuador. However, the Central Bank does manage a large network of museums and libraries, and is responsible for most archeological and cultural research in the country. 8 With respect to growth, however, Edwards and Magendzo (2006) find that growth of GDP per capita has not been statistically different in dollarized and in non-dollarized countries, but that volatility has been higher in dollarized countries than in non-dollarized countries.
risks of dollarization in the banking system. See, for example, Baliño, Bennett, and Borensztein (1999) and Cayazzo, García Pascual, Gutierrez, and Heysen (2006) . Arteta (2002 Arteta ( , 2003 uses the most extensive database created to-date of both deposit dollarization and credit dollarization in the banking systems of 96 countries over the 1980s and 1990s to examine the impact of exchange rate policy on currency mismatches between deposits and credits, and to consider whether financially dollarized countries are more prone to costly crises. Arteta's sample includes most of the Latin American countries examined in this paper, which is a powerful indication of the extent of financial dollarization in the region.
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In countries not experiencing financial dollarization, the dollar is nevertheless often a preferred store of value despite the fact that it is not legal tender. Many people hold dollars in the form of currency, and many hold dollars in bank accounts in the U.S.
because they cannot hold dollars in the local banking system.
Empirical Investigation
This section empirically considers the extent to which Latin American currencies are anchored to the dollar. Whereas Alesina, Barro, an Tenreyro (2003) consider what currencies would logically be anchored to the dollar, we consider the degree to which they are anchored to the dollar. Even in countries experiencing financial dollarization, the degree to which their currency is anchored to the dollar is still an open question.
Preliminary Investigation
9 Arteta's sample includes all thirteen countries studied in this paper except Ecuador, Brazil, Guyana, and Canada.
Countries that are following a dollar standard should have relatively low currency volatility against the dollar as evidence of the link. As a preliminary investigation, Table   2 Table 3 . The average for these three is just 0.44, suggesting that the Mexican peso, the Chilean peso, and Brazilian real are only partially "the same currency". Panel B of Table 3 presents the standard deviations of these currenc ies against each other and against the U.S. dollar. There is not much evidence that
Latin American currencies are any more stable against each other than they are against the U.S. dollar.
Methodology
This paper adapts the perspective of Frankel and Wei (1994) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) to examine the behavior of exchange rates. The main insight is that researchers may detect the influence of various foreign currencies on a particular local currency by using an "outside" currency -the Swiss franc -as a numeraire for measuring exchange rate volatility. The method has been applied to East Asian currencies to assess the influence of the dollar, the yen, and the Deutschemark. we furthermore include the British pound in order to evaluate its influence as a world currency.
10
We work with daily data in order to consider the immediate ties between local currencies and external global currencies. Such analysis is designed to uncover highfrequency "pegging," either through central bank intervention or through fundamental market linkages. However, there may also be a long-run relationship achieved through short-term adjustment processes, so we tackle the question from the perspective of modern time series analysis. In this regard, we consider a methodology involving three steps.
In the first step, we consider the univariate time series properties of the data in logarithmic terms. We principally consider Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests, although we also examine Phillips-Perron tests to confirm the conclusions. We follow the procedures out lined in Enders (2004, pp. 213-214) and carefully examine the serial correlation coefficient (?). If this step reveals that the series are stationary in (log) levels, or I(0), we will proceed to estimate the relationship between local currencies and global currencies using classical least squares regressions of the data in levels. If this step reveals that the series are stationary in differences (of logs), or I(1), we proceed to the second step.
In the second step, we consider the multivariate time series properties by investigating whether the five exchange rate series -that are separately I(1) -are cointegrated. With all series I(1), there may be one (or more) linear combination(s) of the series that is (are) stationary. We use the Johansen trace test statistics (? trace ) to test for cointegration, starting from the hypothesis that there are no cointegrating vectors (r = 0). We specifically focus on the small-sample-corrected trace test statistic.
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In the third step, we examine the relationship between each Latin American currency and the four global currencies. If a Latin American currency is cointegrated with the four global currencies, we examine the coefficients in the cointegrating vector(s) and the properties of the vector error correction process. If a Latin American currency is not cointegrated with the global currencies, we run a classical least squares regression using data in first differences and consider the coefficients estimated that way.
The methodology may be illustrated using SDR exchange rates. The SDR (Special Drawing Right) is a virtual "basket" currency issued by the IMF, and the basket consists of specific amounts of major global currencies. First, we examine the univariate time series properties. Using the log of the SDR/SF exchange rate, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (which happen not to require lags of the dependent variable) are t µ = -2.585 (significant only at the 90% level, and with ? = 0.983) and t = -0.087 (which is not significant, with ? = 1.000). 13 We therefore conclude that the series is nonstationary in levels. For the differenced series, t = -29.794
(which is significant at all levels) and we thus conclude that the series is stationary in differences. Hence, the log of the SDR/SF exchange rate is I(1). Similarly, the four major currencies against the SF are found to be I(1) in logs. We suppress discussion of these tests here, but such discussion would be nearly identical to the discussion for the period 2003-2006 contained below (with reference to Table 4 ).
12 The SDR is regularly redefined, and since January 1, 2006 has contained $0.6320, €0.4100, ¥18.4, and £0.0903. 13 The drift term is significant at the 95% level but not at the 99% level, so there is some room for discretion in favoring t µ or t . Prior tests conclusively rejected the hypothesis of a trend term in the equation. the coefficient on dollar, ranging from 0.00 to 0.21. The inescapable conclusion is that East Asian countries were on a dollar standard during this period. Statistics for the dollar, yen, euro, and pound are shown in Panel A of Table 4 .
Time Series Properties
The four currencies (in natural logs) have autocorrelation (?) coefficients ranging from 0.978 to 0.991 when the drift term is included, and the ADF t µ tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is unity (except for the euro at the 90% level). Thus, we thus proceed to test for the presence of the drift. We cannot reject the hypothesis of no drift in the dollar, yen, and pound, so we present ADF t tests excluding the drift and conclude that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is unity. For the euro, the hypothesis that the series does not contain a drift is rejected at the 95% level but not at the 99% level, thus leaving some discretion in the way to proceed. Retaining the drift, t µ essentially indicates that ?=1 (except at the 90% level). Eliminating the drift, t indicates that ?=1. Hence, we comfortably conclude that all four currencies contain unit roots, and the data are thus nonstationary in levels. ADF t tests on the first differences of the series clearly indicate that the differenced series are stationary, thus leading to the conclusion that the series are I(1). all Latin American series contain unit roots, and are thus nonstationary in levels. ADF t tests on the first differences indicate that the differenced series are stationary, leading to the conclusion that the Latin American currencies are I(1). 
Results

This section considers the influence of the major global currencies on the Latin
American currencies. Based on the results in Table 5 , we first consider the coefficients in a cointegrating vector for Bolivia, the only Latin American currency unambiguously exhibiting cointegration with the global currencies. We then proceed to examine the other currencies using differenced data in least-squares regression. The long-run relationship thus indicates a strong relationship between the dollar and the boliviano, possibly even more than 1:1. In addition, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the euro and the boliviano. There is also a downward trend, corresponding to boliviano appreciation.
To help interpret the results, we consider two hypothesis tests. Based on the results in Table 5 , we examine the influence of the dollar, the yen, the euro, and the pound, on the other Latin American currencies using differenced data in a least-squares regression. This is exactly the methodology of Frankel and Wei (1994) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) . As explained in McKinnon and Schnabl (2004, p. 344) , the coefficients represent the weights of the respective currencies in a currency basket determining the behavior of the local currency. If a currency is closely linked to one of the currencies appearing on the right-hand side of equation (1), the corresponding coefficient will be close to unity. If a coefficient is close to zero, there is no stabilization against that particular currency. A high 2 R coefficient, particularly close to unity, indicates that local currency exchange rates against the Swiss franc can be almost fully explained by fluctuations in major currencies against the Swiss franc. Equations are estimated using the methodology of
White to obtain heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. Table 6 presents summary statistics for the independent variables. For each of the four series, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean is zero, suggesting that all currencies have been relatively stable and have not experienced consistent appreciation or depreciation over the period. The correlation coefficients reveal that the four currencies are moderately positively correlated, in the range from 0.33 to 0.58, but not so highly correla ted as to create a problem with multicollinearity.
The regression results for the Latin American countries are presented in Table 7 .
We include Bolivia in this analysis in order to compare the results from the cointegration methodology to the results from the classical least squares methodology using data in difference. The 2 R values range from 0.07 for Venezuela to 1.00 for Bolivia and nearly all coefficients are sensible. Only one country -Bolivia -has a statistically significant intercept, which in fact suggests an annual depreciation of the boliviano at 1.6%. On the whole, the results for Bolovia in Table 7 are nearly identical to the results from the cointegration methodology, suggesting that differencing the data doesn't do too much harm in the empirical investigation.
Among the coefficients on the independent variables in Table 7 , the coefficients on the $/SF exchange rate are obviously the most important: all 12 are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. In addition, a smattering of other coefficients are significant. Six coefficients on the ¥/SF exchange rate are significant at the 95% level (and two more are significant at the 90% level). Five coefficients on the €/SF exchange rate are significant at the 95% level, although one -for Paraguay -is negative and should be regarded with suspicion. Three coefficients on the £/SF exchange rate are significant at the 95% level (and three more are significant at the 90% level).
The final three columns present various hypothesis tests. The first is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on the $/SF exchange rate change is unity, since a country operating under a dollar standard would be expected to have ß 1 = 1. This is a ? 2 test (with one degree of freedom) since equations are estimated using the method of White to correct for heteroscedasticity among the residuals. Adherence to a dollar standard might imply not only that ß 1 = 1 but also that the coefficients on all other currencies are equal to zero. The penultimate column in Table 7 thus presents a test of the joint hypothesis that ß 1 = 1 and ß 2 =ß 3 =ß 4 =0. This is a ? 2 test with four degrees of freedom. For six countries, the both the hypothesis ß 1 = 1 and the joint hypotheses that ß 1 = 1 and ß 2 =ß 3 =ß 4 =0 cannot be rejected: Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. These results suggest that these six countries might indeed adhere to a dollar standard.
To consider a slightly different perspective on these coefficients, the last column of Table 7 reports a test of the hypothesis that the weights on the currencies sum to unity: ß 1 + ß 2 + ß 3 + ß 4 = 1. For five of the six countries for which the hypothesis that ß 1 = 1 and the joint hypothesis that ß 1 = 1 and ß 2 =ß 3 =ß 4 =0 cannnot be rejected, the hypothesis that ß 1 + ß 2 + ß 3 + ß 4 = 1 cannot be rejected either. The only surprise exception is Paraguay, which has coefficients that sum to 0.787 due mostly to a coefficient of 1.001
on the dollar and -0.280 on the euro. It thus seems that we should discount the negative coefficient -the only statistically significant one in the table -and consider Paraguay as part of the dollar bloc based on the results of the joint hypothesis test.
From the above, it seems that the dollar bloc in Latin America consists of six countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. However, the variation in 2 R suggests that some countries are on a tighter dollar standard than others. Some other countries, for which the hypothesis that ß 1 = 1 and the joint hypothesis that ß 1 = 1 and ß 2 =ß 3 =ß 4 =0 can be rejected, are also close to a dollar standard even if there is some influence from another currency (or two). The test of the hypothesis that ß 1 + ß 2 + ß 3 + ß 4 = 1 helps us interpret some of these situations. Guyana, for example, seems to be on a standard that is approximately 90% the dollar and 9% the pound, with a high 2 R = 0.81. Thus, it might be appropriate to consider Guyana as nearly on a dollar standard. (It also makes sense that Guyana is partly on a pound standard, as Guyana is a former British colony and is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.)
Mexico seems to be on a standard that's approximately 88% the dollar, 7% the yen, and 14% the pound (for a total slightly above 100% although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients sum to unity at the 95% level) with a moderate 2 R = 0.62.
It might be appropriate to consider Mexico as just a little further away from a dollar standard, or on a partial dollar standard.
Colombia might be next in line, with a standard that 80% the dollar, 12% the yen, and 32% the euro (for a puzzling total of 124% and the conclusion that we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients sum to unity), and a moderate 2 R = 0.63. Thus, like Mexico, Colombia is on a partial dollar standard.
Clearly, both the estimate of ß 1 and its contribution to the fit of the regression are important in determining whether a country adheres to a dollar standard. Table 7 , reflecting the importance of the dollar in the overall analysis.
To help determine whether a country adheres to a dollar standard, Figure 1 plots the 2 R value against the estimated coefficient ß 1 . Ecuador is included in this figure, at the point (1,1). Bolivia is very close by, at (1.004,0.996). Peru is also close, at (0.977,0.918). These three countries are on a practically perfect dollar standard.
To evaluate the degree of dollar standard in each country, we calculate the distance of each point from the perfect dollar standard of (1,1) using the formula for the radius of a circle :
. These distances are presented in Table 8 in ascending order. Ecuador is exactly at (1,1) so its distance is exactly zero. Bolivia is shown very close to zero, and Peru is only a little further away.
Six countries that we have discussed before are nearly on a dollar standard.
Moving outward from (1,1), Guyana is next, followed by Uruguay. Subsequently, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay are clustered together.
The furthest point from (1,1) is Venezuela, (0.818, 0.065) by virtue of its low 2 R .
It seems logical not to conclude that Venezuela is on a dollar standard despite its high ß 1 coefficient and an inability to reject the joint hypotheses of ß 1 = 1 and ß 2 =ß 3 =ß 4 =0.
Canada, Brazil, and Chile are the next furthest points from (1,1), at (0.448,0.369), (0.676,0.317), (0.597,0.424), respectively, so it seems logical not to conclude that they are on a dollar standard either. This conclusion is consistent with the earlier finding that we can reject the hypothesis that ß 1 = 1 and ß 2 =ß 3 =ß 4 =0 for all three countries. The
Canadian dollar seems to be based on a basket of dollars, yen, and euros, and is fairly well-behaved because we cannot reject the hypothesis that the weights sum to unity. The
Brazilian real seems to be based on a basket of dollars, yen, and euros also, but the weights puzzlingly sum to more than unity and we can reject the hypothesis that the weights sum to unity. For Brazil, in fact, the coefficient on the euro (0.736) is higher than the coefficient on the dollar (0.676). 14 The hypothesis that Brazil's coefficient on the euro is unity cannot be rejected, suggesting that Brazil is on a euro standard rather than a dollar standard. 15 The Chilean peso seems to be based on a combination of the dollar, the yen, the euro, and the pound (and, in fact, the weights once again sum to more than unity and we can reject the hypothesis that the weights sum to unity). the dollar. These three countries, which also happen to share borders, might reasonably be considered to be a solid dollar bloc in Latin America.
Conclusion
14 Temprano-Arroyo (2003) points out that, "Brazil's low level of dollarization, the closed nature of its economy and its strong trade connections with Europe all argue against official dollarization in Brazil and in favor of maintaining its flexible exchange rate regime (p. 414)." 15 The test statistic for the hypothesis ß 3 = 1 is ? 2 (1) = 2.80 and is significant only at the 90% level. The joint hypotheses tha t ß 3 = 1 and ß 1 =ß 2 =ß 4 =0 can be rejected; ? 2 (4) = 351.46.
Second, four more countries are nearly on a dollar standard. Three of these countries are very small economies -Guyana, Paraguay, and Uruguay --so it might not be too surprising that they are closely connected to the dollar as the major global currency. Guyana has a GDP of $0.83 billion, Paraguay has a GDP of $7.70 billion, and Uruguay has a GDP of $14.30 billion. These are the smallest GDPs of the countries in the sample, although Bolivia is actually smaller than Uruguay with a GDP of $10.22 billion. They are all smaller than Ecuador, which has a GDP of $32.57 billion, suggesting that these small countries might find dollarization relatively easy (as it has been already accomplished in Ecuador). The fourth country in this category is Argentina.
Although Argentina abandoned its 1:1 exchange rate against the dollar and its currency board mechanism, the Argentine peso seems to be persistently, though imperfectly, linked to the dollar.
Third, two more countries are on a partial dollar standard, but exhibit influence from other countries as well. The Mexican peso has a strong link to the dollar, but also is significantly influenced by the yen and the pound. The Colombian peso also has a strong link to the dollar, but is significantly influenced by the yen and the euro.
Four additional countries investigated are further from a dollar standard but are certainly not completely independent of the dollar either. The Brazilian real appears to be on a euro standard rather than a dollar standard, although a better description might be that the currency is based on a basket of euros, dollars, and yen. Similarly, the Canadian dollar seems to be based on a basket of dollars (45%), euros (42%), and yen (9%). These are the two largest countries in the sample (Brazil's GDP is $944 billion and Canada's GDP is $1 trillion), so perhaps it is not surprising that their currencies are not linked exclusively to the U.S. dollar. The Chilean peso seems to be based on a basket of the dollar, the euro, the pound, and the yen. The Venezuelan bolivar seems to move one-toone with the movements in the dollar, or perhaps a little bit less, but the coefficient is so imprecisely estimated (an 2 R of just 0.07) that it seems logical not to conclude that Venezuela is on a dollar standard.
Taken together, these results suggest that the dollar standard is alive and well in Latin America. In turn, the propensity for regional financial integration --indeed, the propensity for additional integration with the global financial markets --is fairly high. Notes: * significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 99% level Note: The number of observations for each series is 1,042. The annualized mean is the mean of the daily data multiplied by 261. The annualized standard deviation is the standard deviation of the daily data multiplied by 261 . Note: The number of observations in each equation is 1,042. * significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 99% level 
